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Mixing Communities? Riots, Regeneration, and 
Renewal on problem estates in France and 
England 
 
BERT PROVAN 
Abstract 
Riots, social exclusion, and endless improvement programmes have been a feature of the poorest 
neighbourhoods in France and England for the last 35 years or more, particularly focused on large 
social housing estates. Programmes of improvement have followed similar paths in each country, with 
mixed success. This article sets out a short overview of these programmes in each country, then 
contrast and compares the objectives, approaches, and outcomes. Each country has key elements of 
inter-agency working, local and resident participation and planning, large scale building rehabilitation 
and demolition programmes, though the French system is more based on specific local contracts 
between cities and the central Departments. Similar evaluation outcome indicators and frameworks of 
floor and “gap” targets have been set, although evidence of success is limited, and particularly in 
France there has been considerable criticism of the approach and framework. In parallel, however, the 
concept of “mixed communities” has emerged as an alternative strategic approach – intuitively 
reasonable politically popular but lacking an evidence base and often ineffective in dealing with 
poverty.  
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Introduction 
Riots, crime, and mass vacancies on large, poor and often isolated housing estates have been a 
recurring problem for the UK and French governments for the last forty years, particularly on high 
rise estates created by the industrialised mass social housing building programmes of the 60s and 70s.   
Those high-profile disturbances in these problem neighbourhoods often provoke “law and order” 
reactions amongst the general public but also draw attention to the underlying deep seated problems 
of concentrated poverty and social deprivation, including highlighting racial discrimination and other 
problems of stigmatisation of the residents and the locality. In response, each country has 
implemented a constantly changing, and only partially successful, string of programmes to try to 
regain control of the underlying social, and security problems. These most often include a focus on 
cross agency and participative social programmes to improve the education, health, and civic 
participation of estate residents, as well as tackling crime and disorder and design defects. Similar 
programmes have been tried in each country – dealing here with England as the other UK nations 
have slightly different and devolved responsibilities - with strikingly similar approaches to gathering 
data and initiating evaluation studies. Part of this has been because of mutual influences, with for 
example the French Zones Franches Urbaines being inspired by John Major’s Enterprise Zones, and 
the creation of the data agency ONZUS being inspired by the similar deprivation data monitoring 
systems implemented in England. In addition, the policy drivers of the often changing priorities and 
programmes have often been political rather than based on evidence; and particularly in France the 
value and effectiveness of the programmes has been subject to extensive criticism based on the failure 
to link policy changes to evidence of outcomes (evidenced by Epstein1, whose comprehensive 
analysis of France has informed this article).  “Success” in many cases has been achieved by large 
scale demolition and rebuilding, often presented as a policy of creating more “mixed” neighbourhoods 
of private and public housing, but also resulting in the dispersal of more vulnerable communities and 
residents to other areas of poor housing, where the underlying social issues remain unresolved. Why 
has this problem been so seemingly intractable?  
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The neighbourhoods and the remedial programmes 
The history of the construction of large social housing estates in the post WW2 period, and their 
subsequent drift into areas of concentrated poverty and social exclusion has been extensively 
documented2. Poverty has historically also been concentrated in other poor areas of cities, where 
industrial workers have been concentrated for the last 150 years, as well as in some rural areas. One 
thing which is not lacking is empirical data on where these neighbourhoods are. In England, since 
2000 these areas of poverty have been mapped at small area level (about 1,400 households) using the 
Indices of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) using seven key dimensions: income, employment, health 
deprivation and disability, education skills and training, barriers to housing and services, crime, and 
the living environment. This was based on a prior 1998 “Index of Local Deprivation”. In France, 
similar information is provided through an “Atlas of Priority Areas (ZUS)” created in 1996 based on a 
1995 index of deprivation (the “Indice synthétique d’exclusion” (ISE))3. After 2003 this was 
developed and managed by the National Observatory of Deprived Areas (ONZUS, now ONPV, 
following the 2014 change to a new index of deprivation and new geography which identifies 
“Quartiers Prioritaires” based on the fraction of the population falling below the 60% of median 
income poverty line).  
Turning to programmes, there is a long history of changing programmes and objectives, although the 
underlying principles can be quickly summarised. The overall objectives of the continuing French 
programme was summarised by the Cities Ministry (in 2011) as 
 “The cities policy (Politique de la Ville) aims to reduce territorial inequalities within urban 
areas by mobilising national and local stakeholders. Designed to house more than five 
million people, the social housing neighbourhoods built between 1950 and 1975 are as part 
of the post war boost are oven poorly integrated into the cities of today…The purpose of this 
policy is to establish a balance within cities which is beneficial to all residents”4.  
In England, a similar statement of direction was set out in 2001: 
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“Over the past twenty years, hundreds of poor neighbourhoods have seen their basic quality 
of life become increasingly detached from the rest of society. People living just streets apart 
became separated by a gulf in prosperity and opportunity....The vision [is] that, within 10 to 
20 years, no-one should be seriously disadvantaged by where they live. People on low 
incomes should not have to suffer conditions and services that are failing, and so different 
from what the rest of the population receives5. 
 
Beneath these pious statements of intent, however, lies a continuous series of policies, programmes, 
priorities, and funding streams to improve the quality of life and life chances of residents of these 
estates, starting in 1977 in France and in 1973 in the England. The two tables below of some of the 
main programmes and their objectives in each country give a flavour of the extent and nature of these 
programmes, as well as the similarities and differences: 
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Date FRANCE: Programme/ Change Overview
1973 Stop to building large new peripheral social housing 
estates
Circular "Barres et Tours" also dealing with tackling social segregation
1977 Launch of "Habitat et Vie Sociale" programme 1st national programme aimed at improving housing conditions and 
social cohesion in 53 social housing estates
1981 "Les Minguettes hot summer" Rioting in one of Lyon's largest social housing estates. Triggered DSQ
1983 Dubedout report "Ensemble refaire la ville" Start of work by Commission Nationale pour le développement social 
des quarters (DSQ)
1984 148 DSQ contracts signed for neighbourhood 
improvements. These were at neighbourhood level. 
First major national programme aimed at radical improvements to 
difficult estates; first set of city contracts
1989-90 Creation of the National Council for  Cities (CNV), and 
the Inter-ministerial Committee for Cities (CIV, chaired 
by the Prime Minister), and the General Secretariat for 
Urban and Social Development (SG CIV) who 
administer the policy 
Provision of a national cross government focus for policy advice and 
programme implementation around the problems of poor 
neighbourhoods. 
1990 Riots and looting at Vaulx-en-Velin, Lyon involving 
clashes between police and residents
President Mitterand appoints Michel Delebarre as first Minister for 
Cities, and pledges action
1991 First "Grands projects urbains" (GPU) or large urban 
projects, addressing a wider geographic area than the 
DSQ contracts. 
Conceived as 10-15 year projects, 14 sites, mainly social housing 
estates but also covering larger areas. Small sums in addition to main 
programme funds
1991 More general provisions: City de-segregation act ("Loi 
d'orientation pour la ville") and City financial solidarity 
act ("Loi de la solidarité financière")
"Orientation" lays the foundation for developing mixed communities 
in every area, whichis backed by the "Solidarity" provisions  allowing 
for transfers of funding from rich to poor areas. 
1996 City renewal pact ("Pacte de relance pour la ville") sets 
up a new urban geography of areas in difficulty  and 
new special "zones". Start of systematic national 
monitoring of areas in difficulty (ONZUS)
"Zones" are priority areas in difficulty for city contracts (ZUS, of which 
751 were identified), areas for additional "re-dynamism" funds (ZRU) 
and wider areas where additional funds and tax advantages to 
companies are available in return for guaranteed  employment  of 
ZUS residents (ZFU). Also special youth employment measures
1999 New "Grand Projects de Ville" (GPV) or large city 
projects, succeeding the GPU project framework. 
These new contracts were to cover the period 2000 - 2006.
2000 City solidarity and renewal Act (loi SRU) Obliged cities of over 3,500 people (1,500 in Ile de France) to provide 
20% social housing (raised to 25% in 2012) - thereby stimulating 
mixed communities
2002 Highly critical Cour des Comptes (similar to UK National 
Audit Office) report criticising lack of progress and 
value for money 
Report concludes lots of activity but too much programme complexity 
and frequent changes, which undermined local innovation and 
effective delivery of improvements
2003 Loi Borloo (named after the then cities minister) sets 
new direction and priorities: "breakup the ghettos" 
through demolition and reconstruction; more 
employment and social support in poor 
neighbourhoods; and simplified, decentralised 
procedures. ONZUS to evaluate progress
Creation of national urban renewal agency (ANRU) to fund the 
demolition of 200k estate homes, rennovate 200k, and build 200k 
new homes in the 751 poor (ZUS) neighbourhoods (€30bn programme 
2004-8). National Urban Renewal Programme (PNRU) launched to 
plan rennovation in 530 neighbourhoods
2005 Multiple and serious riots across France in poor social 
housing neighbourhoods. Six special "equal 
opportunities" senior officials (Prefects) appointed
€200m of damage, 2 deaths, 9k vehicles burned out; 3k arrests; 200 
police/ firefighters injured.
2006 Increased and consolidated activity around poor 
neighbourhoods to address riots and continuing 
problems. New contract structure announced (CUCS, 
city contracts for social cohesion, starting in 2007)
ANRU funding for rennovation increased 25%; 15 new jobs and 
economic support zones created (ZFU); . €100m more for local 
associations; new national Agency for social cohesion and equal 
opportunities (ACSE) to be created. CUCS priorities are housing and 
quality of life;  employment and economic development; education; 
crime and citizenship; and health
2008 "Hope for the excluded suburbs" programme 
(Dynamique Espoir Banlieu") launched 
Aimed to focus cross ministerial action on the poorest 
neighbourhoods. Little major new funding, but 350 “délégués du 
préfet” (central government single points of contact and 
coordination) appointed in the worst neighbourhoods
2012 Another highly critical "Cour des Comptes" (NAO) 
report on lack of progress and value for money in the 
programmes 
Used evidence from ONZUS to illustrate lack of progress in closing 
gaps between worst neighbourhoods and average. Criticisms 
included over complexity of programmes, lack of ministerial 
coordination nationally, and lack of local/central coordination; lack of 
resident consultation; poor linking of housing development to social 
programmes; underfunding and poor use of funds
2014 Completely new framework of contracts and priority 
neighbourhood geography announced, put in place by 
the" Loi de programmation pour la ville et la cohésion 
urbaine" (City programmes and urban cohesion Act).
New contract priorities are social cohesion, living environment, and 
urban renewal.  1,300 neighbourhoods in the period 2014-2020, 
alongside a new €5bn National Neighbourhood Renewal programme 
(NPNRU). 
2016 ONZUS (neighbourhoods observatory) becomes ONPV 
(National City Policy Observatory), reflecting the new 
contracts and the new geography based on poverty
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Despite this striking variety of delivery programmes, there are three main underlying approaches. These 
are measures focused primarily on: 
• Improving the physical infrastructure of the neighbourhood and its buildings, including urban 
and economic investment in the neighbourhood or estate, demolition or renovation of the 
buildings and environment, remodelling and changes of the image or layout of the estate (for 
example to demolish walkways which contribute to crime, or wholesale demolition and 
rebuilding), and changes to the density (for example “decapitation” of 4 storey blocks to  
produce two storey terraced homes) 
• Addressing the needs and issues of the people including their education and training needs, job 
readiness projects, improving levels of social capital and strengthening local associations, 
addressing health issues including drug addiction, and introducing strict crime prevention 
Date ENGLAND: Programme/ Change Overview
1967 Additional state subsidy for building high rise social 
housing withdrawn
Esates in the pipeline continued to be built, but no further stimulus 
for high rise
1978 Urban Programme Financial assistance to innner cities and local partnerships
1979 Priority Estates Programme First programme to explore local housing management on hard to let 
estates
1981 Government Report "An investigation into difficult to 
let housing" 
First systematic government review of extent and scale of problems 
on social housing estates
1985 Estates Action Programme Aimed at estate based management, diversity of tenure, private 
investment, and new management models like trusts
1991 City Challenge Extension of Estates Action, but competitive funding targeted on 
larger more run down areas
1994 Single Regeneration Budget Consolidated several related funding streams; competitive bidding
1999 New Deal for Communities programme 39 neighbourhoods with £50m over 10 years of locally controlled area 
regeneration aimed at "closing the gap" with average
2000 Indices of Multiple Deprivation (also 2004, 2007, 2010, 
2015)
New comprehensive assesment of crime, worklessness, skills, 
health, poverty, housing and enviroment in small areas (LSOA) of 
around 1,00 households, and rank index of deprivation based on 
these
2001 National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal Programme vision was: "that withon 10-20 years no-one should be 
seriously disadvantaged by where they live" aimed at "floor targets" 
(minimum standards) for crime, health, skills, housing and physical 
environment, and also closign the gap of these areas and the average
2010 End of national programmes, and responsibility 
devolved to cities under Localism agenda
NSNR framework abandoned, and resonsiblity for neighbourhood 
renewal given to local authorities under "localism" agenda; 
developed within some "city regions" such as Greater Manchester's 
"inclusive growth" agenda
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programmes. This also includes measure to change the balance of “vulnerable” households, and 
introducing a wider range of tenure through “mixed” communities policies, whereby more 
middle class people and people in employment would be encouraged to move onto the estate by 
building affordable homes to buy, and expecting those households to “pass on” social values 
and standards  
• Address the wider externalities including linking the neighbourhood more closely to the wider 
city economy through better transport links, job training and recruitment programmes, 
improving local schools, hospitals, commercial centres, and leisure facilities, and encouraging 
new economic activity in or near the neighbourhood. 
Often these estates only come to public notice in moments of crisis. Public disquiet was aroused 
following outbreaks of civil disturbance (including major riots in France in 1990 and 2005 - with 
simmering anti-police discontent still current, - and in England in 1981, 1985, 1995, and 2011). 
Meanwhile the IMD and ONZUS provided detailed empirical evidence about concentrated pockets of 
disadvantage focused action in specific small areas and estates. To take a comprehensive area based 
approach to the problems – and linking the three main types of measures set out above - required the 
intervention of several different local and national state agencies, as well as the private sector and semi-
public agencies like housing associations in England and HLMs in France.  
The initial phase of these programmes was experimental and innovative in both countries, with groups 
like the CNDSQ in France and the Priority Estates Programme in the UK developing and testing a range 
of design and housing management ideas in different cities and neighbourhoods. 
These locally based approaches subsequently led to ideas about “Interministerial” action in France 
(from 1990 in France), and parallel “joining up” in England (from 1997). This involved identifying the 
need to coordinate the wide range of public, private, and third sector interventions in a way that would 
add value to each individual sector specific intervention (e.g. housing, policing, education) in a 
specified small area neighbourhood. This “joining up” should be seen in the contest of the intellectual 
and administrative tension between “neighbourhood” programmes and “mainstream” programmes in 
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both countries. The first are organised around the idea that specific “neighbourhood” level actions and 
“locally joined up” actions are central to delivering better outcomes. This was sometimes based around 
the idea that there is an independent “neighbourhood effect” driving disadvantage in these areas, over 
and above the specific effects of poverty, worklessness, poor health, poor housing, and other social 
problems being addressed in “silos” by national programmes. In contrast “mainstream” approaches take 
the improvement of wider specific basic services as the starting point – better schools, better job and 
skills training, targeted economic growth programmes, national housing improvement standards and 
security improvements, with an emphasis on investing more effort and money in the poorest schools, 
housing, and low employment areas. These national and generally massively better funded programmes 
are often seen as being capable of targeting the underlying drivers of deprivation and poverty in all 
areas where they are needed, including in these poorest problematic areas. Tackling these key drivers of 
disadvantage will, under this approach, be sufficient to tackle even the most concentrated pockets of 
deprivation. This debate is informed by extensive statistical analysis which undermines the notion of an 
independent “neighbourhood” variable, although such statistical evidence does not end the more 
political and ideological tension between supporters of either mainstream or of local actions.  
Consequently, and as might be expected, in both countries a mix of the neighbourhood and mainstream 
approaches has been adopted, which has in part contributed to the mixed record of success set out 
below. One striking aspect, however, is the level of national and Ministerial “ownership” of the 
neighbourhood programmes, at least up until the UK coalition government essentially abolished central 
monitoring and programming in this area in 2010. National governments like to be seen to be taking 
action to deal with the poorest, crime ridden, neighbourhoods. In France there has been a central 
Ministry of the City since 1990, coordinating action at a political and administrative level; and the 
period of the Labour government (1997-2010) in the UK saw the creation of the “National Strategy for 
Neighbourhood Renewal” as part of the portfolio for the Communities and Local Government Ministry 
(under its frequently changing names), with the responsibility for coordinating policies and programmes 
across government departments, as well as responsibility for funding and close monitoring of the 
performance of local government.  
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The nature of the oversight and management of programmes differed significantly, however. France set 
up a frequently changing system of  detailed “contracts” between cities and their national and 
departmental partners which specified outputs and actions (DSQ, GPU, GPV, CUCS…). In contrast in 
England between 2001 and 2008 almost £3bn of funding from the Neighbourhood Renewal Fund 
(NRF) was allocated to local authority districts which included the most deprived areas in England – 
originally to 88 (subsequently 86) local authority districts. Responsibility for programme planning and 
investment was vested in a new set of “Local Strategic Partnerships” (LSPs) which involved the key 
city level agencies (housing, social services, environmental services), working alongside other local 
agencies like the Police authority, as well as regional or local representatives of national Government 
bodies (the Benefits Agency, Regional Investment boards) and the private sector. In contrast to France, 
while in England a substantial network of “good practice” advisors was set up, no specific contractual 
or delivery arrangements were mandated, and LSPs were free to choose how to deliver the key 
outcomes in housing, education, crime, health, and other measures. It is also of particular importance to 
note that these specific NRF outcomes being measured were at city level, rather than neighbourhood 
level, in contrast to the more area specific French neighbourhood focused programmes 
In addition in England there was a separate, more localised, New Deal for Communities (NDC) 
programme which was targeted on a newly created set of 39 “NDC Local Partnerships” chosen using 
the IMD and other evidence. These “local partnerships” comprised representatives of the local statutory, 
voluntary, community and private sectors in the NDC area to plan action, allocate NDC funds, and be 
accountable for outcomes achieved. The idea behind the programme was that better outcomes could be 
achieved by the formal devolution of around £50m of specific funds over 10 years to be divided 
amongst and controlled by each of the 39 local neighbourhood boards where residents were “at the 
heart of” the process.  Here the outcomes were focused on and judged in relation to the specific small 
neighbourhood, and not at the city level.  
Street level local resident engagement and empowerment were essential elements of both French and 
English programmes. This was partly based on the wish to build social capital amongst the residents as 
part of the regeneration process, and partly a wish to identify local needs more clearly through 
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participative engagement. Youth engagement could often be a problem, however, as well as tensions 
between different groups on the estates with competing priorities. Local elected city council members 
also provided a competing locus of democratic voice, in competition with estate based groups who 
could be highly motivated but less legitimate claim to be representative of all the residents. For 
example, conflicts around priorities for spending in the English NDC areas were not uncommon 
between the city government and the local NDC partnerships.  
Meanwhile, however, alongside these specific programmes to directly tackle the problems of the 
poorest areas, the idea of “mixed communities” was emerging as a more general planning and urban 
improvement idea. In 1991 two new French laws (on “City de-segregation” and on “City financial 
solidarity” – see table above) laid the groundwork for avoiding the creation of more social housing 
“ghettoes” of poverty; and the English 1984-94 Estates Action programme required tenure 
diversification in council housing estates, progressively adopted as part of regeneration schemes by 
later UK governments, and highly influenced by the Hope IV programme in the USA. The underlying 
principle (or perhaps seemingly obvious but naïve idea) is that since concentrations of mono-tenure 
social housing estates appears to lead to problems of poverty and deprivation in those areas, the solution 
needs to involve avoiding or destroying mono-tenure and creating “mix”. This eventually came to be 
highly influential in influencing, and undermining, other neighbourhood programmes.  
 What happened? Evaluations and criticisms 
The short answer is that neighbourhood  in each country showed some progress in some places, but not 
enough to achieve the intended major changes hoped for. The poorest neighbourhoods are still in place, 
and their problems continue (including with the 2017 disturbances in the Paris suburbs). In addition, 
there have been significant criticisms of the programmes in France; and in England they have now been 
abolished almost completely. Alongside, the “mixed communities” approach has emerged as an 
increasingly favoured approach, and in the UK is now also an important element of identifying funding 
to enable estate regeneration and new social housing building, considered in more detail later.  
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Monitoring of “neighbourhood programmes” in both countries includes a mix of “floor standards” and 
“gap analysis”, and in England these measures had the status of formal targets during most of the 
Labour period (1997-2010). In brief a floor standard is a national absolute level below which no 
neighbourhood in the country should fall, and education programmes target all and any failing schools. 
For example in England in the 2000s education targets set out that no school (including those serving 
deprived neighbourhoods) should be so bad that not even 25% of pupils attain basic qualifications; and 
in health policy no neighbourhood in the country should have more than a fixed level of teenage 
pregnancy. The most deprived areas in England were monitored against these floor targets. In contrast 
gap standards are a relative measure which compares the changes in a “deprived” neighbourhood’s 
outcomes to a national comparative average (identifying “deprived” neighbourhoods using the English 
ONS or French ONZUS geographies). An example would be around economic growth and reducing 
worklessness, where a gap measure would look at whether the improvements in employment rates in 
the “deprived” neighbourhoods were keeping pace with any national average improvements, with the 
aim that they should actually be improving more than average and in that way “closing the gap” 
between the poorest neighbourhoods and the average.  ONZUS reports provided data on gaps between 
neighbourhoods and their parent city in terms of measures such as level of qualification, income, and 
worklessness, but unlike the UK there was no “carrots and sticks” (not even naming & shaming 
systems) to drive local policies.  Other monitoring approaches in both countries can include a mix of 
self-assessment by local agents of progress, output measurement (numbers of buildings demolished or 
refurbished), and resident surveys.  
Reviewing the French outcomes, some key outcomes for the period 2003-10 include for social 
outcomes: 
• Unemployment: Gap (of poor neighbourhoods to the average) up from 8.3 percentage points to 
10.6  (2003 vs 2010) 
• Income gap up 
• Poor health gap:- 6.4 percentage point gap for people in poor or very poor health in 2010  
• Delinquency : a positive: 16% reduction in delinquency 2005-10 
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Output figures for this period include: 
• 150,000 homes demolished 
• 140,000 new build homes 
• 340,000 rehabilitated homes 
• 360,000 upgraded homes 
 
These outputs were delivered using €46.2 billion of National Urban Rehabilitation Programme (PNRU) 
funding, 25% supported by the National Agency for Urban Rehabilitation (ANRU) 
More telling, however, was a set of two reports on the overall programme compiled by the French Cour 
des Comptes, which is a similar body to the UK National Audit Office, charged with reviewing the 
value for money and performance of programmes incurring public spending. The 2002 report6 set out 
that the centrally directed cities policies to date have been characterised by: 
 unclear strategies and objectives  
• regularly changing processes  
•  a consequent unclear jumble of rules and confused focus on different areas for action 
• an insufficient attention to the necessary cross departmental aspect of the work  
• deployment of specific central funding to drive activities which are to the detriment of a more 
innovative and coordinated set of actions across all the agencies in the most deprived areas 
 
In turn the 2012 report7 set out that evidence indicated: 
 inequalities persisting despite a decade of reforms 
 little  movement in the gaps across the indicator areas 
 increasing numbers of areas for priority interventions 
 an unprecedented effort of renovation, poorly linked to the social actions of the programme 
 uncertainty as to whether the theoretical budgetary priority theoretically accorded to the poorest 
neighbourhoods is actually being given 
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 a risk of using specific budget allocations to substitute for mainstream spending 
 
The English National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal and NDC programmes were subject to 
extensive independent commissioned evaluations8, commissioned by the Communities and Local 
Government Ministry. This national report, covering the period between 2001 and 2010, indicated that 
compared to the English city average, in the NRU areas: 
• Overall gaps had stabilised, and narrowed on worklessness and educational attainment  
– but things had become worse on health and crime 
– and after the Global Economic Crisis gap started to open 
• There was additional investment from mainstream programmes which were aligned 
– Sure Start, Decent Homes, Housing Market Renewal, Schools programme  
• Savings from reductions in worklessness were five times the estimated £312m spent on this 
issue. 
• Effective new ways of local partnership working were introduced through the Local Strategic 
Partnerships (LSP) 
 
This aspect of the local partnership through LSPs was found by the evaluation to be particularly 
important. They were judged to have delivered a range of outcomes in terms of partnership working and 
strengthening local governance through better prioritisation and coordination of local spend and actions. 
This means they are likely to have contributed to the delivery of service improvements as part of the 
NRU programme, and the model was rolled out to all English local authorities in 2009. Despite this 
evidence of effectiveness, LSPs were subsequently abandoned by the 2010 Coalition government, who 
indicated that any national level interference in how cities delivered services was contrary to their 
overarching principle of “localism” or minimal state intervention unless essential (based on little 
coherent or robust empirical evidence or comparative evaluation studies).   
In addition, the NSNR evaluators created a useful “typology” of neighbourhoods based on in and 
outflows of different groups of people (definitions from DCLG/Amion 2009, with author’s edits): 
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1. Transit areas are deprived neighbourhoods in where people move in from richer areas – 
perhaps newly-established middle class young households on limited incomes, starting out 
on the housing ladder – then move on, but moving elsewhere to a less deprived area as their 
careers progress. 
2. Escalator areas attract in movers from areas which may be similarly deprived, or 
immigrants from other places in the UK or elsewhere. Move on becomes part of a 
continuous onward-and-upward progression through the housing and labour markets. This 
is different to Transit areas in that the in-movers move in from areas that are equally or 
more deprived. Residents may be older (and not newly forming households).  
3. Gentrifier areas are ones in which there is a degree of social improvement since most in-
movers come from less deprived areas and most out-movers go to similarly or more 
deprived areas. This could be seen as a form of gentrification, displacing poorer residents, 
(and can be seen as the model for “mixed communities”, although this is not stated in the 
Amion report).  
4. Isolate areas represent neighbourhoods in which households come from and move to areas 
that are equally or more deprived. Hence they can be seen as neighbourhoods that are 
associated with a degree of entrapment of poor households who are unable to break out of 
living in deprived areas. 
 
The importance of this typology is that is provides a more nuanced approach to the types of area 
improvement activity and investment which may be effective in reducing deprivation and poor 
conditions.  
 
For the NDC, there were specific local evaluations of each of the 39 NDC areas. In addition there was 
an overall summary NDC national report, covering the period of 2002-2008, using a wide set of 34 
indicators of outcomes. This indicated that these neighbourhoods saw more positive change than in the 
parent City for 10 of 13 indicators; net positive change was especially marked in relation to burglary 
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and all three Key Stage education attainment levels. Compared to a control group of similarly deprived 
comparator areas, NDC areas saw statistically significant more positive changes for 11 indicators. 
Overall the biggest improvements were for indicators of people’s feelings about their neighbourhoods: 
NDC residents recognise change brought about by the NDC Programme and are more satisfied with 
their neighbourhoods as places to live. This may be due to physical improvements reflecting the 
conclusion that NDC areas have seen more net change with regard to place-related change (housing and 
environment  improvements which accounted for a third of all spend), rather than people-related 
outcomes.  In all, from 1999 the 39 NDC partnerships spent a total of £1.71bn on some 6,900 projects 
or interventions. A further £730m was levered in from other public, private and voluntary sector 
sources. The NDC evaluation estimated savings to the public purse as between three and five times the 
amounts invested. 
 
The issue of “mainstreaming” needs to be highlighted here also, however. While the NRF invested 
around £2.4bn of public funds, and the NDC some £1.7bn, alongside this the Labour government had 
invested considerably more on “mainstream” improvements which in many cases were also focused on 
the more deprived neighbourhoods. This included, for example, the Decent Homes programme which 
brought 90% of social housing up to a good standard (£22bn spend), the Sure Start programme which 
provided 3,500 Sure Start children’s centres, two thirds of which were in the most deprived areas 
(around 0.5bn annual spend 2005-10), increased Health expenditure (£60bn between 1997/8 and 
2009/10) and the Building Schools for the Future programme to refurbish all poor schools, focused on 
deprived areas (over £5bn). These amounts dwarf the expenditure on specific neighbourhood 
improvement programmes, and in each case have a targeted impact on the problems affecting those 
neighbourhoods. The English evaluations used comparator areas to gauge the specific impact of the 
neighbourhood based improvement programmes, and in this way attempted to take account of this 
wider mainstream expenditure, but the importance of “mainstream” spend should not be 
underestimated.  
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In both countries, then, there have been modest improvements, but in the context of changing 
programme and contract requirements, and a range of parallel mainstream funding programmes. The 
specific neighbourhood programmes were complex and often appeared to change in response to 
political drivers and priorities rather than the evidence of effectiveness of programmes and better 
outcomes. For example, Epstein has written extensively about this in France, and it is reflected in the 
Cour des Compte reports above. And in England, the 2010 new Coalition government immediately 
decided to declare that neighbourhood deprivation was a matter for local city government to deal with 
and abolished both Local Strategic Partnerships and large elements of the system of floor and gap 
targets despite evidence of their effectiveness – as well as sharply reducing the Sure Start and Schools 
building programmes. Curiously although the French programmes have had a more critical evaluation, 
they still continue, whereas the English programmes showed modest successes but were abolished. 
Overall the programmes failed to gain much political traction or wide popular support  (unlike, for 
example, the more domain specific English health programmes for cutting waiting lists, or reducing 
street homelessness, or some of the more police based anti-crime programmes in France). Mixed 
communities, however, tended to have both political and public support, as set out next. 
 
Mixed Communities – the answer? 
Perhaps the most prominent example of the driver of political preference rather than evidence is the 
continuing focus on “mixed communities” in both countries. This is a programme which was first 
promoted in the USA through the HOPE (Homeownership and Opportunity for People Everywhere) 
initiative. It essentially views concentrated social housing and associated poverty as the main driver of 
neighbourhood problems, and sees creating a mix of tenures, incomes, and classes as being the main 
answer.  In France, mixing has been central to neighbourhood policy since 2000 where the Loi SRU  
required every area above a certain size to have a minimum proportion of social housing available. In 
UK, planning regulations now require similar provision of “affordable” units within new developments, 
and social housing providers regularly plan renovation schemes including a mix of social housing and 
new homes to buy. It should be noted that the English approach is now almost inevitable in the absence 
of state subsidy for social housing, which means that building homes for sale (or for rents higher than 
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social rent levels) is now the main financial vehicle to subsidise the building of new social housing, or 
to build a property portfolio which is able to be used as collateral for large money market borrowing to 
keep social housing providers in business.  
 
As well as avoiding mono-tenure areas, two underlying rationales can be found to justify this “mixing” 
approach:   
•  “Moral” (exogenous) mixing – new professional families  entering a poor neighbourhood can 
to teach deprived residents some standards of  good behaviour  
•  “Capacity building” (endogenous) mixing: the presence of a more varied (and employed) 
population will diversify existing residents’ opportunities through exchanges of social capital. It 
will also help retain socially mobile households and build on existing current strengths and 
capacities of the poor community 
 
In fact research evidence so far provides little evidence of success with this policy either. Research by 
Ruth Lupton9 in England found little evidence of better outcomes in mixed schemes compared to non 
mixed schemes. And in France both Lelévrier (2010)10, and Kirszbaum & Epstein11  found that the 
policy often displaces poor residents who are to other (often worse) poor neighbourhoods, and that in 
fact rather than mixing the process of importing these new communities creates rich “sub-
neighbourhoods”. Kirszbaum & Epstein comment:  
 
“The social mixing approach has been devised by the rest of society, often against the wishes of the 
existing neighbourhood residents” (ibid) 
 
Nevertheless the mixed communities approach continues to have political and popular support, based 
partly on the not unreasonable idea that building or tolerating “ghettoes” of poverty creates pockets of 
crime and deprivation. 
 
Concluding remarks 
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Detailed and regularly updated small area data shows the continuing presence in France and England of 
neighbourhoods which are isolated from social and economic opportunity, and which house high 
concentrations of households with multiple problems who are subjected to ethnic and other forms of 
discrimination. This is a social issue which needs to be tackled, and not ignored. That said, we need to   
recognise that public pressure to take action may be driven by a desire to “rid” society of these problem 
neighbourhoods and the crime they are seen to harbour, based on the myth that the residents of these 
estates are essentially criminals, shirkers, and responsible for their own  disadvantages. As set out 
above, these myths may be part of the popularity of mixing communities.  
 
A starting point for the way forward may be to recognise that actually “mainstream” programmes to 
tackle poor schools, pockets of poor healthcare, unfit and badly managed housing, poor transportation, 
inappropriate skills training, poor leisure facilities and similar poor services can be efficiently targeted 
by their respective local and national departments in a way that recognises a wider range of poor areas 
as a whole (and not just the very poorest) need  improvement. Funding can and should be directed to 
those local priorities driven by a more specific range of progressive and needs based funding criteria 
and targets in each domain (Ministerial) programme. The alternative approach of creating special 
programmes, complex bidding and rigid monitoring procedures with complex and malleable criteria 
seems to create layers of paperwork and administrative effort with, from what has been set out above, to 
have questionable effectiveness. The English Local Strategic Partnership approach of “joining up” local 
partners seems lighter touch, although the previous superstructure of continuous monitoring of hundreds 
of “gap” and “floor” targets may fail to focus on the key indicators of deprivation and poverty (but 
some specific nationally consistent and targeted local monitoring of key outcome indicators remains 
essential). 
 
Second, economic growth is a key factor in area renewal. There is clear evidence, however, that the 
benefits of economic renewal and growth do not flow to the poorest neighbourhoods without some 
explicit programmes of training and job linking. This requires clear political leadership and long term 
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planning to link poor areas, and other poor and unskilled households, to the job opportunities using 
bespoke training, job linking, quotas, and other mechanisms to ensure benefits spread to the more 
disadvantaged households. Lee et al (2014)12 have set this out in detail for England, and many levers 
already exist and are in use in some places in France to achieve this for example to give priority to local 
people for training and employment in renovation and development schemes.   
 
Third, although in principle breaking up monolithic large isolated peripheral estates of system build and 
unpopular housing seems intuitively a good idea, there is no evidence that it is a successful policy. 
What matters is how this is done. It seems clear that new build housing developments should certainly 
have a mix of tenures, to prevent a re-creation of past problems. In addition, where schemes are 
developed to improve existing tenanted estates, such schemes should recognise the strengths of the 
existing community, and put in place measures to retain and strengthen that community as far as 
individual resident households wish this (which is to say any choice to remain should be 
accommodated). Also, the key question of the inevitable problem of partial displacement of some 
residents must be clearly tackled. It is not a good policy to shunt unsupported and vulnerable residents 
to other parts of cities where the support services may be poor and opportunities no better. Planned 
moves provide the opportunity to improve their quality of life, and address the underlying social and 
family issues.  
 
Third, for environmental and cost reasons rehabilitation and renewal of existing buildings should be 
undertaken in preference to demolition, even if this means remodelling for a more varied client group.  
 
Finally, the possibility of social mixing between residents of different incomes and backgrounds within 
“mixed community” developments (and any intended benefits) will not be realised without specific 
actions to encourage and enable this. The most commonly observed outcome of mixing is de facto 
division into semi-gated sub-estates of different tenures and classes (where the only mixing may be the 
youth of the rich buying their recreational drugs from the youth of the poor). Ares of shared interest for 
all households include children and their education, leisure facilities, environmental conditions, safety 
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and security, and local commerce and services. Clearly the risk is that the better off go to private 
schools and gyms and shop in up market groceries, but these present opportunities to build links and 
more importantly build trust. 
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